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25 percent  in  1980, bringing the cumulative  reduction  in  three years to 43 
percent. 
The worsening of income distribution in this period was the consequence of 
inflationary pressures being reflected in contract prices (such as wages) only 
with a lag whereas other prices could adjust freely.  ironically,  the resulting 
relative-price structure would be maintained and consolidated in the post- 1980 
period of adjustment. As will be discussed at greater length in the following 
two  chapters,  the  inflationary  episode  of  1977-80  had  disturbing  effects 
which outlasted this period. 
3.3  Concluding Remarks 
Was there an alternative? Given the necessary retrenchment on the current 
account, it was inevitable after 1977 that real expenditures would have had to 
be cut somewhat. Instead, the authorities acted as if the crisis might go away 
if ignored, setting off an inflationary spiral which eroded the real incomes of 
the  poorest  segments  of  Turkish  society.  A  series  of  bold  measures  of 
expenditure reduction and expenditure switching early on in the game might 
have enabled the economy to avoid some of the worst excesses of adjustment 
via  inflation.  In  the  event,  letting  inflation  do  the  job  of  cutting  real 
expenditures  proved  a  very  costly  method  compared  to  the  obvious 
alternative of  reducing nominal spending itself.  In any case, the policies of 
the  1978-79  period did not seriously tackle any of the underlying problems 
of  the economy, and they were incapable of promoting recovery.  The latter 
would have to wait for the  1980s. 
4  Stabilization and Adjustment 
Policies,  1980- 85 
As  described  in  the  earlier  chapters,  Turkey  became  the  first  major 
developing country debtor to face a deep payments  crisis in  the  post-1973 
period.  Because  of  the  poorly  managed  macroeconomic  environment  and 
massive short-term borrowing, Turkey’s debt rout arrived early in mid- 1977 
before  the second oil shock of  the  late  1970s. A heavy reliance on import 
compression in combination with unrestrained nominal expenditures resulted 
in an inflationary  slowdown of  growth during  1978-79.  The accompanying 
shortages  in  commodity  supplies  produced  wide  public  discontent.  The 
unsuccessful  implementation of  the IMF standby arrangements also strained 663  TurkeyIChapter 4 
relations  with the Fund  and the international  financial community.  Against 
the background of deteriorating economic performance and increasing social 
and  political  tensions,  Turkey  had  parliamentary  by-elections  in  October 
1979, which resulted in the resignation of Ecevit’s cabinet and the formation 
of  Demirel’s minority government. 
Faced  with  a thoroughly  destabilized  macroeconomic picture.  Demirel’s 
minority  government  introduced  a  new  policy  package  in  January  1980. 
After the resumption of growth, together with a sizable inflation reduction in 
1981, the policymaking process, with the full support of the IMF and World 
Bank,  increasingly  focused  on  export-oriented  adjustment  issues  and 
liberalization reforms in the economy. Turkey gained an acceptable degree of 
creditworthiness by  1982-83,  just as most of  the major LDC debtors were 
entering a disruptive crisis phase in their development. The Turkish recovery 
has been accompanied, indeed partly caused by, an export boom which has 
taken even the most optimistic observers by surprise. The relative success of 
the Turkish adjustment policies since 1980 has been undeniable. 
In the aftermath of  the Mexican debt-service moratorium  in August  1982, 
the IMF and World Bank have stressed  trade and financial liberalization  in 
their high-conditionality programs for LDCs with debt-servicing difficulties. 
Together  with  the  well-known  cases  of  the  export-oriented  East  Asian 
economies, Turkey’s recent adjustment  experience has been  showcased  by 
these  multilateral  institutions  as  a  successful  application  of  their 
liberalization-focused approach to the management of the LDC debt crisis. 
The current  policy  debate on the LDC debt crisis  is concerned with  the 
efficacy of the official international approach to a number of  crucial points. 
As  aptly  argued by  Sachs (1986) and Dornbusch  (1985), fiscal  correction 
problems are very serious in the LDC debtors, as the bulk of external debt is 
held  and  serviced  by  the  public  sector.  The  trade-liberalizing  measures 
involving sizable depreciation of  the exchange rate often tend to overburden 
the budget-correction  process and destabilize  the internal balance. As noted 
by Sachs (1985), in his comparative analysis of  the Latin American and East 
Asian cases, the political-economy  context also matters  in the maintenance 
of  realistic  exchange  rate  and  commercial  policies  in  the  pursuit  of 
export-led  growth  processes.  Nonetheless,  in  recent  years  distributional 
aspects and social costs have invited very little formal concern in launching 
adjustment programs. 
In the context of the contemporary policy debate on the LDCs, a balanced 
review  of  the recent  Turkish  experience, as  well  as other country-specific 
case  studies,  may  provide  useful  points  for  generalized  assessments. 
Turkey’s outward-oriented  experiment in the  1980s is still a continuing  one 
and  contains  imperfections  as  well  as  strengths  in  the  way  conditions  for 
equitable  and  sustainable  growth  in  the  long  run  are  being  established. 
Hence, Turkey’s policymakers  may also benefit from expost assessments of 
the policy and adjustment patterns observed in the post-1980 period. 664  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
A number of earlier reports and papers by official agencies and individual 
authors  offer  useful  accounts  of  the  Turkish  economic  recovery  in  the 
1980~.~  While drawing on the data and commentaries of  the earlier studies, 
our analysis  strives to focus on the overall  pattern  of  policy  sequence and 
interdependencies,  and  to  bring  out  the  key  linkages  in  the  adjustment 
process.  Rather  than  treating  policy  elements  and  actual  outturn  in  one 
unified chapter, it appears more convenient to discuss the nature of policies 
in the present chapter (with occasional references to performance  data), and 
analyze the anatomy of the adjustment process in chapter 5. 
4.1  Special Factors Affecting Economic Performance 
Before  proceeding  with  the  discussion  of  policy  aspects, certain special 
factors that have played a role in Turkey’s recent economic recovery  should 
be pointed out. The purpose of this is not to downgrade the domestic policy 
effort, but to provide a more balanced picture for intercountry comparisons. 
Among  a host of  special  factors  prevailing  in  the  policy  setting, the  most 
salient ones are the following. 
Domestic Political  Context. Although  initiated by  Demirel’s  government 
in  January  1980,  the  implementation  of  the  new  stabilization  program 
received  not  only  continuity  but  also additional  political  clout  under  the 
military rule from September 1980 to November  1983. The military regime 
retained Turgut Ozal, the principal  technocrat  behind  the new  program, as 
deputy prime minister during  1980-82.  With the return of Ozal as the newly 
elected prime  minister  in late  1983, the  liberalizing  measures  were  further 
extended  and  strengthened.  Besides  ensuring  continuity  in  the  policy 
process,  the  interim  military  arrangements  facilitated  legislative  and 
administrative  changes  pertaining  to  the  structural  components  of  the 
program.  Furthermore, the  presence  of  the  military  in  the  political  arena 
made it possible to attain downward flexibility in real wages and agricultural 
prices-which  we  will  stress  in  the  next  chapter as a  key  aspect of  the 
adjustment  process-and  to  avoid  open  distributional  conflicts  in  policy 
implementation. 
Sizable  Debt Relief  and New Lending.  The post-1980 policy  experiment 
benefited  from  the  debt relief, balance-of-payments  assistance, and  policy 
support  of  the  major bilateral  creditors  (mainly  the  OECD countries) and 
multilateral  lending  institutions.  As  we  will  discuss  in  greater  detail  in 
chapter  9,  the  debt  relief  granted  through  the  OECD  Aid  Consortium 
reached  $4.6 billion in  1980-85.  Not only the size, but  also the timing of 
the external assistance was beneficial to Turkey’s economic recovery. During 
the  difficult  stage  of  1980-83,  the  cumulative  net  resource  transfer 
(excluding  the  minor  items connected  with  foreign  direct  investment)  was 
nearly a positive $2 billion, which obviated the need to generate surpluses in 
the noninterest current account. The effective policy dialogue with the IMF 665  TurkeyKhapter 4 
and  World  Bank  has  facilitated  debt  relief  agreements  and  concessional 
bilateral lending in the  1980-85  period. 
Special Market Conditions in the Middle East. The trading opportunities 
in the Middle East assumed special political characteristics with the Iran-Iraq 
military  conflict  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  To  offset  the  cyclically  unfavorable 
export conditions in the OECD region, a comprehensive effort was made by 
Turkey  to  penetrate  the  Middle  Eastern  and  North  African  markets.  The 
marginal  share of  the Middle East in the expansion of merchandise exports 
in  1980-83  (from $2.9  billion  in  1980 to $5.7 billion  in  1983) was  68 
percent. The export drive to this region was complemented by the rapid rise 
in construction projects, the value of which reached $12 billion in 1981 from 
$3 billion  in  1979. In turn, the incremental contribution of  the Middle East 
has lessened  after  1983 with the reemergence of the OECD region  (mainly 
the EEC countries) as the predominant  trading area for Turkey, accounting 
for  around  55  percent  of  both  exports  and  imports  in  1985.3  The 
econometric work reported  in chapter 7 is suggestive of the  important  role 
played by Middle Eastern demand in Turkish exports after  1980. 
4.2  Latin American Debtors and the Turkish Case: A Digression 
To  place the policy  review  for Turkey  in  a more relevant  cross-country 
context,  attention may  also be drawn  to a basic  similarity,  as well  as to a 
number of differences, between Turkey and major Latin American debtors in 
their crisis management in the  1980s. 
One basic similarity pertains to the structural nature of external capital in 
the pre-crisis growth process. At least until the mid-l970s, Turkey and major 
Latin  American  debtors  (e.g.,  Mexico,  Brazil,  and  Argentina)  pursued  a 
development  strategy  that  centered  on  a  growing  home  market  and  used 
external  capital  to  supplement  domestic  savings  in  investment.  The 
prolonged  maintenance of  heavy protection and the exhaustion of relatively 
easy import-substitution  possibilities eventually  yielded  a productive  struc- 
ture which rigidly depended on imported inputs almost in fixed  proportion^.^ 
As  observed  by  Dornbusch  (1986,  138), these  heavily  indebted  countries 
have been  structural importers  of  capital,  facing a wide range of  short-run 
structural  impediments  in  restoring  external  balance.  Unlike  the  cases of 
flexible open economies, the  rapid  return  to external  balance from a large 
deficit position  cannot be accomplished just by cutting down overspending, 
at least not without substantial losses in output. 
In  coping with structural rigidities in the adjustment process,  the Turkish 
experience in the 1980s differed, however, from the Latin American cases in 
four key respects. First, Turkey could secure sizable new lending in the early 
years of the recovery effort, and thus bolstered its foreign exchange position 
to  resume  the  needed  growth  of  imports  in  overcoming  the  structural 
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Second, Turkey’s  public  finances  were  not  overburdened  by  external  debt 
servicing  in  1980-83,  largely  due  to the  debt  relief  granted  by  its  major 
creditors through the OECD Aid Consortium. Third, unlike in major Latin 
American  economies, the  Turkish  policymakers  did  not  have  to deal  with 
indexed  contract  prices,  and  therefore  could  attain  a  credible  price 
stabilization-through  an orthodox  shock treatment-in  the earlier years of 
the program.  Fourth,  the dependence on primary exports was considerably 
less in Turkey than in the Latin American region, which suffered as a whole 
substantially  from  the  sharp  fall  in  primary  commodity  prices  in  the 
post- 1982 peri~d.~ 
4.3  Broad Strategy and Policy Objectives 
In retrospect,  it seems clear that the  new  economic  team  under Ozal by 
late  1979 had  made a thorough  assessment  of  the earlier policy  trials,  the 
current situation, and possible future actions. 
As discussed in chapter 3, it was evident that immediate corrective actions 
were  needed  to  regain  control  over  monetary  expansion  and  to  relieve 
commodity shortages. The evaluation of past policies pointed to the adverse 
consequences  of  aborting  trade-liberalization  objectives  in  the  earlier 
stabilization  episodes, and of  subsequent appreciation of the real  exchange 
rate  which  produced  an  anti-export  bias  in the  growth  process.  To  restore 
creditworthiness,  it was necessary  to attain a rapid rise in foreign exchange 
earnings through domestic efforts. The resumption of growth seemed to be 
essential in gaining public confidence in the policymaking process.  Drawing 
lessons from past experiences and recognizing the limited scope for further 
import  compression  in  the  country’s  current  stage of  industrialization,  the 
economic  team  persuaded  Demirel’s  government  to  introduce  a  bold  and 
comprehensive set of policy measures on 24 January  1980. Apparently, these 
measures went further than the proposals and requirements of the IMF.6 
The package  of January  1980 was  specific  on policy  measures,  but  not 
explicit on the magnitude  and  sequence  of  objectives  sought  in  the  future 
performance of the economy.  In  retrospect,  it  can be stated that the policy 
objectives  were  basically  twofold:  (I) to attain,  as quickly  as possible,  an 
acceptable  degree  of  price  stability  combined  with  export-led  (output) 
recovery,  and (2) to achieve a greater outward-orientation  of  the economy 
through a sequential liberalization and structural adjustment. 
The new  strategy  was  more  of  an  approach  and  a  style, rather  than  a 
blueprint  for  future  actions.  Besides  featuring  a  strong  commitment  to 
flexible pricing,  this  approach  emphasized  gradual  changes  in  institutional 
mechanisms  for  the  development  of  a  unified  market  economy.  The 
gradualist character of the overall strategy was  stressed by  Ozal in  a  1982 
interview as follows: 667  TurkeyIChapter 4 
Change  has  to  be  gradual;  we  try  to  have  what  I  call  dynamic 
programming,  but, in  certain areas, change has  to be  step by  step. For 
example, on January 24 [1980] we did not free interest rates. Six months 
later we freed them. But real freedom came at the beginning of last year 
[1981], when the banks started to fight each other. The same applied with 
foreign exchange. This year [1982] we hope to change the line protection 
scheme, which we couldn’t change immediately  because people  were so 
used to it. (Euromoney  1982) 
In the discussion of the broad strategy, a further observation relates to the 
policymakers’  preference  for the  simultaneous  pursuit  of  macroeconomic 
stabilization  and  export-led  recovery  in  Turkey’s  post- 1980  adjustment 
effort.  This  point  is  important  for  our  subsequent  discussions,  requiring 
preliminary  remarks at this juncture. 
Although  committed  to  a  rapid  disinflation  in  the  early  stage,  the 
policymakers were well aware of the potentially adverse consequences of  a 
prolonged recession in the Turkish economy. Too rapid a squeeze in the real 
sector  could  have  discouraged  the  manufacturing-based  export  initiative, 
which required complementary actions in a wide range of sectors. An early 
success  in  export  promotion  was  perceived  to  be  essential  to  restore 
creditworthiness,  establish  the  credibility  of  liberalization  measures,  and 
extend  penetration  in  foreign  markets  for  a  sustained  export drive  in  the 
future. 
After attaining a reduction  in the annual rate of  inflation  from over 100 
percent  in  mid-1980  to  around  30  percent  in  mid-1981,  the  policymakers 
began  to  emphasize  export-led  output  expansion  also  to  avoid  higher 
unemployment in the urban sector, which had experienced a sharp fall in real 
wages  in  1979 and  1980. In  fact, to reinforce  the  growth  process,  public 
investment was increased (about 9 percent) in real terms in  1981, partly to 
offset the continuing decline in private investment, despite the advice to the 
contrary by the international financial agencies. 
Against the background of continual upward adjustments in the exchange 
rate and SEE prices, domestic inflation settled around a 30 to 35  percent core 
rate in the post-1981 period, which saw a fairly steady expansion of output 
through  1986 (as will be discussed in chapter 5). In turn,  the persistence of 
inflation around this rate  (with a substantial amount of variability) reduced 
the information content of relative price changes, possibly retarding deeper 
allocational restructuring in the economy. 
4.4  Policy Mix and Sequence 
After this discussion of the initial conditions and overall policy trends, we 
now  take  a  closer  look  at  the  pattern  and  content  of  policy  measures 
introduced  in  early  1980 and  extended  thereafter.  The time  frame  for our 668  Merih CelAsun and Dani Rodrik 
present analysis is the  1980-85  period.  For convenience in presentation, the 
entire set of measures  is loosely referred to as the post-1980 program. The 
time horizon is extended to 1986 in chapter 8, in which we deal with public 
sector finances. 
While benefiting  from hindsight,  an  ex  post  classification  of  the  wide 
range of  measures taken in  1980-85  involves three  sets of  methodological 
problems. First, the policy measures had mutually interdependent effects on 
the observed economic performance.  Second, their effects spilled over time 
in a non-uniform fashion. Third, some of the more important measures were 
qualitative in character, the effects of which were expected to be seen in the 
longer  run.  Thus,  a  precise  mapping  of  policy  instruments  onto  policy 
objectives, on the basis of  a well-defined  set of criteria, is neither possible 
nor critically necessary in the context of our principal concern with the basic 
pattern of Turkish policies in this period. 
Having  stated  these  caveats,  in  this  section  we  present  a  crude policy 
taxonomy  which is shown in table 4.1. As can be seen from the table, the 
main policy measures  implemented  from 1980 to 1985 can be classified in 
three  main  categories:  (1) measures  basically  aiming  at  stabilization  and 
export-led  recovery,  (2) liberalization  measures,  and  (3) supportive fiscal 
and institutional actions. Four successive policy  stages are identified  within 
the 1980-85  period, which roughly take place in 1980, 1981-82,  1983, and 
1984-8s.  In the  table,  the  implementation  subperiods for specific  policy 
measures are marked by the sign (x), where the occasionally  used  sign (?) 
indicates  the  doubtful  nature  or  weak  application  of  the  corresponding 
measure. 
Although  a further breakdown  of  the policy  measures and  subperiods  is 
possible,  the  level  of  disaggregation  adopted  in  table  4.1  appears  to  be 
sufficient to identify  the  seven  main  characteristics  of  the  policy  mix  and 
sequencing as follows. 
(1)  Because  of  the  severity  of  internal  and  external  imbalances,  the 
program  emphasized  macroeconomic  stabilization  in  the  first  year  with  a 
heavy  reliance  on  price  shocks  (mainly  exchange  rate  devaluations and 
increases  in  the  price of  public  enterprise  products), which  complemented 
monetary and budget restraint. The brunt of  adjustment in the budget was on 
the SEE subsidies and social expenditures. 
(2) With an early emphasis on export promotion, a clear signal was given 
to producers  that  output  recovery  would  be  induced  by  export expansion. 
The  maxi-devaluation  of  January  1980 was  followed  by  frequent  mini- 
devaluations  through  May  1981.  From  May  1981 onward  (to the  end  of 
1983), the  exchange rate  was  adjusted  daily  against  a  currency  basket. 
Besides  devaluations, export incentives  included  tax  rebates, credit  subsi- 
dies, an exchange retention scheme, and duty-free imports for the production 
of exportables. 669  TurkeyKhapter 4 
Table 4.1  Mix and Sequence of Policy Measures,  1980-85 
1980  1981-82  1983  1984-85 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 










b.  Interest rate shock 
c. SEE Price hikes 
Flexible pricing of exchange rate,  interest rates 
(partial), and industnal products (partial) 
Supportive incomes policy for downward flexibility 
of real wages and agricultural prices 
Tight monetary  stance 
Budgetary restraint 
Export incentives (exceeding 20%  total subsidy on 
Debt relief and net new lending 
eligible manufactures) 
B. Liberalization measures 
1.  Flexible pricing (same as A.2): deregulation  of 
product markets (partial), decontrol of 
interest rates (partial) 
2.  Import liberalization 
a. Removal of quotas, retention of  licensing 
b.  Introduction of a Prohibited  List 
c. Major reductions in licensing 
d. Realignment of  tariffs 
3. Partial decontrol of external financial flows 
4. SEE reform legislation 
5. Financial development 
a. Capital Market Board 
b.  Framework for stock exchange 
c. Bank supervision system 
6. Encouragement of  foreign direct investment 
C.  Supportive fiscal actions and institutional  changes 
I. Restructuring public investment 
2.  Tax incentives for financial intermediation 
3. Income tax reform 
4. Introduction of VAT  system 
5.  External debt management (improved debt 
reporting system) 
6. Sector-specific actions (planning and pricing 
schemes for energy and agriculture) 
7.  Extrabudgetary  funds 
X 
X 
X  X 
X  X 
X 
X  ? 
X  X 
X  X 









X  X 
X  X  X 
X  X  X 
X 
X  X 
X  X  X 
X 
Source:  The authors’ ex post classification of major policy measures 
(3) The  initial  stabilization  effort  was  strengthened  by  two  additional 
factors: namely, a supportive incomes policy, and sizable debt relief and new 
borrowing. The incomes policy worked in implicit ways through restrictions 
on labor union  activity,  delays in  wage  adjustments,  real  reductions  in the 
salaries  of  government  employees,  and  restrained  nominal  increases  in 
agricultural  support  prices.  The  increased  foreign  exchange  availability 670  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
contributed  to  the  elimination  of  hoarding  of  essential  commodities, 
enhancing the workability of the new program. 
(4)  The overall  liberalization  process  proceeded  in  four  distinguishable 
steps.  The sequence was as follows: First,  industrial product markets were 
deregulated (with the initial exceptions of fertilizers, coal, electricity, sugar, 
and  certain  oil  products).  Second,  interest  rates  were  to  a  large  extent 
deregulated  in  mid-1980.  This step consisted  of  decontrol  of bank  deposit 
rates and  free setting of nonpreferential  lending rates.  Third, a preliminary 
step in import liberalization came in mid-1981 in the form of the removal of 
the quota list from the import  regime. With the elimination  of quotas, the 
import  policy  relied  on  licensing  and  prohibited  imports  as  restrictive 
devices until  1984. Fourth, the import regime was further liberalized and a 
partial  decontrol of  external  financial  flows  was  undertaken  in  one unified 
major step at the end of  1983 and early  1984. 
(5) Financial  sector reforms, SEE reorganization,  and encouragement  of 
foreign  direct  investment  (FDI) constituted  other supplementary  measures 
with  varying  degrees  of  strength  and  success.  Besides  the  deregulation  of 
interest rates in mid-1980, the major policy initiatives for the financial sector 
included the establishment of the Capital Market Board (1981), introduction 
of  a  new  framework  for  the  stock  exchange (1983), legislation  of  a  new 
banking  law and regulatory system (1983-85),  and creation of  an interbank 
money market  (1986). 
(6) On the SEE front, the main emphasis was on price flexibility, a hiring 
freeze, and real wage reductions.  The reform legislation for the SEEs came 
rather  late  (1983). The new  legislation delineated  the particular  SEEs that 
would function on the basis of market  criteria.  Privatization  studies for the 
SEEs  were  initiated  in  1985-86.  Policy  measures  related  to  FDI  were 
mainly  directed  toward  a  more  flexible  and  simplified  application  of  the 
existing legislation on FDI, which contained highly liberal provisions.8 
(7) Finally,  the remainder of the policy measures  shown in table 4.1 are 
classified as supportive fiscal actions and institutional changes. This category 
includes rationalization of public investment,  tax incentives for exports and 
financial intermediation, income tax reform, adoption of the value-added  tax 
(VAT) system, and sector-specific actions for energy and agriculture (mainly 
involving improved planning and pricing schemes).  Income tax reform was 
helpful in creating more realistic tax brackets and reducing marginal rates for 
wage and salary earners. After showing an initial rise (to about 20 percent) 
in 1981, the tax/GNP ratio dropped (to 16.6 percent) in 1984. Because of  the 
lagging tax performance, the overall budget correction was achieved instead 
through the SEE price hikes and restrained  current expenditures. 
As  summarized  above,  Turkey’s  liberalization  drive  proceeded  in 
successive  stages.  In  its  basic  outline,  it  followed  the  general  pattern 
suggested in the literature, which argues in favor of the following sequence: 
fiscal correction, deregulation of product and financial markets, liberalization 671  TurkeyIChapter 4 
of the current account, and decontrol of  the external financial  flows in the 
balance of payments.’ 
Turkey’s  liberalization  effort  should  not  be  viewed,  however,  as  a 
completed process. As of late 1987, it still contained a number of incomplete 
aspects  such  as:  a  complicated  system  of  preferential  credits,  fragmented 
financial  markets,  political  interference  in  SEES, and  arbitrarily  handled 
import  permissions  and  levies.  Despite the  remaining  imperfections,  these 
reforms  constitute  in  their  entirety  a  credible  policy  package,  which 
broadened  the  role  of  market  forces  in  determining  the  direction  of  the 
Turkish economy.  Some of the key  aspects of  policy  pertaining  to relative 
prices are reviewed in sections 4.6 and 4.7, following some remarks on the 
role of  the IMF and World Bank in the next section. 
4.5  IMF and World Bank Conditionality 
The implementation of  the  1980-85  policy measures  outlined in  section 
4.4 benefited from the balance-of-payments assistance and policy support of 
the  major  creditors  and  international  financial  organizations.  A  three-year 
standby  arrangement  concluded  in  June  1980 with  the  IMF (SDR  1,200 
million, 625 percent  of quota) was followed by  a one-year standby in June 
1983 (SDR 225 million), which was later cancelled and replaced  by  a final 
one-year arrangement  with the Ozal government  in April  1984. In turn, as 
shown in table 4.2, the World Bank provided five structural adjustment loans 
(SALs) totaling about $1.6 billion  in support for liberalization reforms and 
rationalization  programs in the energy, agricultural,  and financial sectors in 
addition  to  regular  project  lending.  The  smooth  and  effective  policy 
cooperation with the IMF and World Bank facilitated multilateral debt relief 
agreements and concessional bilateral lending in the  1980-85  period. 
In their work with Turkey, the IMF and World Bank collaborated closely, 
with their conditionalities determining,  to an important extent, the contents 
and modalities of the policy frame sketched in table 4.1. The overall concern 
of  the  IMF  with  the  management  of  aggregate  demand,  the  payments 
Table 4.2  World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) for Turkey 
Disbursements to 
Loan  Date of Approval  Amount (million $)  31 December 1984 
SAL 1  3/25/80 
Supplement  11/18/80 
SAL 2  51 1218 1 
SAL 3  5/27/82 
SAL 4  5/23/83 













Source:  Yagci et al. (1985) 672  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
regime, and the exchange rate was complemented by the efforts of  the World 
Bank  focusing  on  trade  liberalization,  resource  mobilization,  financial 
development, public  investment  planning, SEE reorganization, and  sector- 
specific  issues.  The  IMF  relied  on  the  standard  performance  criteria, 
emphasizing  interest  rate  reform,  ceilings  on  net  domestic  assets  of  the 
central  bank,  subceilings  on central  bank  credits  to  the  SEES, limits  on 
contracting  new  external  debt,  and  currency  depreciation  in  a  unified 
framework.  The  World  Bank  was  particularly  effective  in  its  public 
investment review and trade policy conditionalities, which are listed in table 
4.3.  The policy  actions envisaged in  five successive SALs for the gradual 
liberalization of  the import regime, as disclosed  in table 4.3, illustrate how 
deeply the World Bank was involved in the policy process. We will return to 
the role of these Bretton Woods institutions in chapter 9. 
4.6  SEE Price Hikes and Agricultural Support Prices 
As indicated  in  the  policy  overview above, a  key  aspect  of  the  reform 
package  in  1980  was  a  restructuring  of  key  relative  prices  within  the 
Table 4.3 
Issues and Objectives 
World Bank SAL Conditionality for ImporI Liberalization 
Issues 
1. Exchange rate policy 
2. Elimination of quotas 
3. Rationalization of  tariffs 
Objectives 
Improved efficiency of  production and support exports by reduction  in anti-export  bias 
Policy Measures Envisaged 
SAL I (1980) and SAL 2 (1981) 
Flexible exchange rate policy after January 1980 (SAL I), daily adjustment after May 1981 (SAL 2) 
Initiation of a protection study (SAL 1) 
Abolishment of  the quota list in the 19x1 import regime and reduced licensing of imports (SAL 2) 
SAL 3 (1982) 
list 
Further reductions  in  licensing and simplified procedures; continual  expansion of  the liberalization 
Commitment to rationalize the tariff system over the next five years 
Preparation of a list of  prohibited items 
SAL 4 (1983) 
Introduction of  a rational tariff structure, adoption of  a timetable by September 1983 for shifting 
from licensing system to one relying on tariffs 
SAL S  (I  984) 
Reduce remaining  licensing for imports to a negligible level during the fifth plan period (1985-89) 
drawing on the recommendations of the completed protection  study 
Source:  Yagci et al. (1985) and World Bank. 673  TurkeyIChapter 4 
economy.  We  start our  discussion  here  by  looking more  closely  at  SEE 
prices and agricultural support prices. Table 4.4 documents price changes for 
selected SEE  and agricultural support items from 1979 to 1983. It also gives 
the official estimates  for percentage  annual  changes in the wholesale  price 
index (WPI), SEE  revenue, and real GDP over the same period. 
The data in table 4.4 reveal that, relative to the WPI, SEE  prices moved 
sharply upward and agricultural support prices moved generally downward. 
In  interpreting  the  agricultural  price  movements, we should  also note  that 
prices of  agricultural inputs (such as fertilizers and mafarin) shifted sharply 
upward  in real terms, as subsidies were reduced. Thus, the impact of  new 
policy measures was more pronounced on the net rather than gross prices of 
agricultural  products.  Moreover,  delays  in  payments  for  agricultural 
support  purchases  also  served  as  a  mechanism  to  restrain  farmers'  real 
incomes. 
The SEE  sales revenue showed a substantial rise in real terms in 1980-82, 
especially  in the first year of  the program.  In  the  context of  a falling real 
GDP in  1980, we  may  infer  that  the SEE sales revenue increased  almost 
entirely due to price hikes, which were introduced in one major step in early 
1980. Hence, the sharp rise in the inflation rate in  1980:I and  198031 (see 
table 4.5 below) reflected to a substantial extent the cumulative impact of  the 
maxi-devaluation,  SEE  price  corrections,  and  deregulation  of  private 
industrial prices. 
Table 4.4  Changes in Selected SEE and Agricultural Support Prices 
- 
Percentage Annual  Increase 
1979  I980  1981  1982  1983 
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Impressionistic  evidence on SEE sales  revenues  and  real  GDP  growth 
rates (as shown in table 4.4) suggests that the demand curves for most SEE 
products were largely  inelastic in  the short run. In the absence of sufficient 
competition from imports (before 1984), the emphasis on SEE  price hikes to 
augment public  revenue resulted  in significant  departures from competitive 
pricing in domestic product markets. Moreover, the available data on private 
industry suggest that the profit markups have not changed significantly in the 
post- 1980  period."  These  observations  suggest  that  the  deregulation  of 
industrial  prices  has  not  produced  by  the  mid- 1980s a  highly  competitive 
market structure in the Turkish economy. 
4.7  Interest Rates, the Exchange Rate, and the Monetary Stance 
Aside from SEE  prices and agricultural support payments, two other key 
prices  directly controlled  by the  government  were the  interest  rate and the 
exchange rate. The sharp change in the policy attitude toward the latter two 
macroeconomic  prices  was  perhaps  the  most  noteworthy  aspect  of  the 
post-1980 program. 
Table 4.5 provides  quarterly  data  from  1979:I  to  1985:IV on  inflation 
rates, real interest rates, and real exchange rate changes. The inflation rates 
are measured  as percentage changes in the WPI over the previous year; the 
real interest rates are after-tax returns on one-year bank deposits deflated by 
the  WPI;  and  the  exchange rate  depreciations  are the  percentage  changes 
over the previous year in an export-weighted  index of the real exchange rate 
(increases correspond to depreciations). 
A  scrutiny  of  the  data  shown  in  table  4.5,  especially  from  1980:II  to 
1981:11,  points  to  the  brisk  realization  of  a  30  percent  exchange  rate 
depreciation and a nearly 45 percent rise in the real deposit rate at the outset 
of the program.  These produced  a ratchet  effect  in the overall price level, 
and in combination with the SEE  price hikes led to an unprecedented  price 
shock in the economy.  In the absence of full monetary accommodation,  the 
resulting  squeeze on real  money  balances produced  a temporary recession, 
but also served to cut the annual rate of  inflation from 115 to 35 percent in a 
relatively short span of time. 
The effect of  these  relative-price  shocks  on the  macroeconomic  balance 
can be observed in the trend  for real money balances.  Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
show the quarterly movements in the levels and annualized rates of  change 
of  the real monetary base (MB) and of real broad money (M2), from 1979:I 
to 1985:IV. As pointed out in chapter  1, M2 is a reasonable overall indicator 
for  the  scale  of  the  Turkish  financial  sector,  which  is  dominated  by  the 
banking  system. From  1979:I to  1980:II, the cumulative real decline in M2 
was nearly 40  percent,  with  most  of the reduction taking place  in the  first 
two  quarters of  1980.  This gave  rise  to a  heavy  squeeze  on  the  banking 
system and correspondingly to a rapid expansion  of the unorganized credit 
market. 675  TurkeyIChapter 4 
Table 4.5  InRation, Interest Rate, and the Exchange Rate 
% Change from Previous Year’s Same Quarter 
Inflation Rate (WPI)”  REERb Depreciation Rate  Real (Net) Interest Rate (I-yr deposits) 
1979:I  50.2  -  10.3  -25.2 
I1  62.7  -20.2  -29.6 
III  66.6  -2.7  -31.5 
IV  72. I  -8.6  -35.9 
1980:l  112.2  27.2  -43.5 
I1  115.6  38.6  -42.0 
111  101.5  25.1  -32.3 
IV  98.6  30.5  -32.5 
1981:l  60.2  -  0.6  -11.3 
I1  35. I  -  2.4  2.8 
111  37.2  -0.7  0.7 
IV  27.5  13.1  8.7 
1982:  1  26.2  17.1  8.1 
II  30.0  14.8  4.5 
111  24.7  16.3  8.7 
IV  22.4  10.9  11.5 
1983:I  24.6  7.6  7.4 
I1  25.8  7.4  7.8 
111  31.2  I .7  2.3 
IV  39.0  0.3  I .9 
19843  44.1  6.8  9.3 
I1  54.6  4.4  2.0 
111  54.7  3.  I  1.9 
IV  52.2  I .o  2.7 
1985:I  49.2  -6.4  3.3 
I1  40.2  0.3  10.3 
111  35.8  4.6  9.7 
IV  37.7  4.3  8.5 
Source:  Central  bank  of  Turkey  for the  WPI  and  real  (net)  interest  rates; own  calculations  for the  real 
effective exchange rate. 
*The WPI denotes the Treasury wholesale price index. 
qhe  REER is the real effective exchange rate (export weighted, using WPI) 
In such a context, where the rate of decrease in real M2 had reached 30 
percent  (in  annual  terms)  in  1980:II,  the  government  deregulated  deposit 
rates in July  1980 and freed nonpreferential lending rates. The deregulation 
of deposit rates was at first followed by a “gentlemen’s  agreement”  among 
major  banks,  which  put  a  ceiling  on  the  nominal  rates.  But  eventually 
collusion collapsed under the impetus of the smaller, more aggressive banks, 
as well  as the  pressure  from  the  unorganized  money  market.  The real  net 
interest rate on decontrolled deposits went from an average of -  32 percent 
in  1980 to 9 percent  by  1981:IV, and to an average of  8 percent  in  1982. 
Following the decontrol of  deposit rates and the introduction of certificates 
of  deposit (CDs), real balances for M2 increased at much faster rates than 
the  real  MB  from  1980:II  to  1982:IV,  indicating  a  substitution  of 
interest-bearing  accounts  for  cash  and  an  upward  drift  in  the  monetary 676  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
Fig. 4.1  Real money balances (in constant 1963 prices) 
multiplier  (M2/MB).  Hence  the  high  interest  rates  contributed  to  the 
monetization of  the economy as it recovered  from the recession. 
While broad  money  responded  favorably  to the rise  in  deposit  rates,  a 
consequence  of financial reform was that the lending rates for nonpreferen- 
tial  credits  soared.  They reached  unsustainable  levels of  25-30  percent  in 
real terms in 1981-82.  A significant part (guesstimates running around 40 to 
60 percent)  of  the nominal  credit expansion in this subperiod  was directed 
toward  refinancing  the  interest  payments  connected  with  nonperforming 
loans. The illiquidity problems of  the private corporate sector stimulated the 
activities of the so-called bankers  (brokerage houses)  that traded bank CDs 
and corporate bonds and provided  loans at rates higher than nonpreferential 
bank  lending  rates.  The  unregulated  activities  of  the  unorganized  credit 
market  eventually produced  a financial crisis in  mid- 1982 after the collapse 677  TurkeyIChapter 4 
Fig. 4.2 
same quarter) 
Percentage change in real money balances (from the previous year's 
of the largest broker (Banker Kastelli).'* The response to this crisis included, 
besides the replacement of  key cabinet ministers, a relaxation of  monetary 
policy,  which  had  been  quite  tight  at  first,  and  the  introduction of  new 
guidelines for the financial system. At the end of  1982, the central bank was 
reauthorized to fix ceilings on deposit rates. 
As  shown in table 4.5, real deposit rates in 1983-84  were lower than in 
1981-82.  However,  they  exhibited  a  large  degree  of  variability  during 
1983-84.  What was the cause of  this variability, and why has it apparently 
lessened from 1985:II onward? 
The fluctuations in real deposit rates in 1983-84  reflected to a large extent 
the attempt of  policymakers to realign the real rates according to the official 
inflation targets, which were, however, persistently exceeded by  the realized 678  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
inflation rates.  This caused an instability  in expected rates, resulting in the 
stagnation of demand for broad money (see fig. 4.1). 
From 1985:II on, real deposit rates were stabilized at a higher level, partly 
as a response to the introduction of  foreign exchange deposit accounts with 
Turkish commercial banks at competitive interest rates. The new interest rate 
policy  began  to  take  into  account  the  arbitrage  equilibrium  conditions  to 
contain  currency  substitution  within  reasonable  limits.  Hence,  from  early 
1985 onward, domestic real  deposit  rates  tended  to match  the  world  rates 
(about 4 to 5 percent) adjusted by a margin corresponding to the rate of real 
depreciation of  the exchange  rate plus  a perceived  risk  premium.  We  may 
conclude that the prior experience with domestic financial liberalization was 
helpful in handling the new situation brought about by the partial decontrol 
of  the capital account at a later stage. But the latter policy has also implied 
higher real interest  rates domestically, under the joint influence of financial 
openness and sustained real exchange rate depreciations. 
4.8  A Missing Element: Political Participation and Contestation 
By  postponing  the  analysis  of  the  actual  outturn  to  chapter  5,  in  the 
present chapter we attempted to provide an overall review of  the  1980-85 
policy  measures.  Our  discussion  emphasized  the  supportive  factors, 
sequencing patterns,  and  selected technical characteristics pertaining  to the 
pricing aspects. Our policy review leads us to conclude that the policy mix in 
this  period  as  a  whole  was  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  country 
adjustment  programs  applied  in  recent  years  with  the  full  support of  the 
multilateral  lending agencies. Notwithstanding the social costs involved,  the 
initial  strength  and  sustained  implementation  of  the  program  were  quite 
impressive in technical terms, especially in the light of the ineffective policy 
trials of  the earlier periods. 
In concluding this chapter, we may question whether the  1980-85  policy 
episode had  any missing element  in  an important sense. Our answer is an 
affirmative  one,  and  we  suggest  that  broad  political  participation  and 
contestation  were  crucial  elements  missing  in  this  important  national 
experience. 
The bulk of the 1980-85  program coincided with transitional military rule 
in  Turkey,  such  rule  having  been  instigated  essentially  on  noneconomic 
grounds.  The program  did  not  sufficiently  benefit  from critical evaluations 
and possibly  constructive proposals of the various groups of  participants  in 
the  political  and  economic  life  of  the  country.  The  lack  of  political 
participation  also  undermined  the  medium-term  policy  planning  process, 
which could have reduced the social costs of  the program (to be reviewed at 
the end of the next chapter). On the other hand, the prevailing restrictions on 
political participation and contestation were clearly instrumental in providing 
the  technocrats  with  the  requisite  autonomy  to  introduce  a  wide  range  of 679  TurkeyJChapter 5 
radical reforms and the ability to withstand the distributional consequences. 
It  is  to  be hoped  that  this  missing  element  has  not  deeply  hampered  the 
foundations of a long-term social commitment to a more viable development 
strategy. 
5  Performance and Adjustment 
Patterns in the 1980s 
After the review of  the policy measures in chapter 4, in the present chapter 
we aim to analyze the  performance  and  adjustment patterns of the Turkish 
economy  in  the  post-1980  period.  Following  a  brief  look  at  the  actual 
outcome in section 5.1, in the remainder of the chapter we seek to explicate 
the  major  macrolevel  mechanisms  and  linkages  in  Turkey’s  recent  adjust- 
ment experience. While leaving the quantitative treatment of selected topics 
to  subsequent  chapters,  we  focus  here  on  the  anatomy  of  the  overall 
adjustment process,  including the distributional aspects. 
The main argument  in the present analysis  is that changes  in  macroeco- 
nomic prices have played  a determining role in Turkey’s overall adjustment 
effort.  In this context, we consider the following as macroeconomic prices: 
the  exchange  rate,  interest rates, SEE prices,  real  (urban)  wages, and  net 
prices (or domestic terms of trade) for major sectors. In the Turkish setting, 
real wages and sectoral net prices were determined by and large as residual 
variables, while the exchange rate, interest rate, and SEE prices served more 
directly as policy instruments. 
On the subject of relative prices and distortions, the economic literature has 
been  mainly  concerned  with  microlevel  efficiency  and  welfare  issues.  As 
aptly analyzed by Balassa (1987) recently, and Krueger (1974b) and Bhagwati 
(1971) earlier, policy-induced market distortions tend to have adverse effects 
on  resource  allocation  and  employment. The permanent  removal  of  these 
distortions  would  involve  transitional  costs, but  could  bring  a  continuous 
stream of future benefits,  as emphasized  by  Fischer  (1986).  The post-1980 
Turkish  policies  did  make  a  genuine  effort  to  remove  a  wide  range  of 
distortions that prevailed in the pre- 1980  period, but market imperfections and 
related  inefficiencies  continue  to exist, as discussed  in the  context of  SEE 
prices in section 4.6. The investigation of remaining microeconomic distor- 
tions and their allocational effects is an important item in the agenda of future 
empirical research on Turkey.  But our emphasis in the present chapter is on 
the macroeconomic consequences of a sharply altered relative-price structure, 
as took place in the Turkish economy. 